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Abstract
The main objective of this paper is to explore the adjustment of bank business 
activities to new regulatory capital requests using panel data analyses of the 
European banking system. The research hypothesis assumes that the increase in 
capital requirements affects the banks’ balance sheet adjustment and bank lending 
to the non-financial sector. The banks can maintain the higher regulatory capital 
ratio by increasing the volume of share capital or by decreasing the risk-weighted 
assets and bank lending activities. The high equity premium upon a new equity 
issue due to asymmetric information about the bank’s net worth discourages 
the current shareholder to issue additional capital, which has resulted in bank 
lending constraints and has increased non-risk bank assets. Banks’ response 
to new capital requirements can announce a long-term negative impact to real 
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economy and bank depending borrowers. The model of empirical analysis of the 
banking sector adjustment to new capital requirements will be demonstrated on 
the sample of publicly listed banking firms in the European Union in the period 
2000–2016 using dynamic panel-data estimation with the Generalized Method 
of Moments (GMM) in one-step. 
Keywords: dynamic panel, bank capital, bank lending, risk-weight assets
JEL classification: C33, D53, F65, G21
1  Introduction
Under the Basel III regulatory framework (BIS, 2010), banks have been 
faced with new capital requirements in the content of capital structure and 
the regulatory capital ratio. The European Parliament and the Council have 
introduced prudential constraints, with respect to the Basel III capital standard, 
to the European Union (EU) banking system (European Parliament and Council 
Regulation No. 575/2013 of 26 June 2013). The basic argument for new capital 
requirements is that the higher equity ratio promotes banks’ financial stability 
by reducing the probability of distress of a banking firm and by reducing bank 
incentives in taking a risk position and increasing the buffer against bank loses. 
The most important consequence of additional capital requirements should be 
the downsizing of banking risks and an increase of banking system stability 
during the financial crisis periods. Some authors have researched the relations 
between higher capital requirements and bank risk assets. The empirical results 
have shown that higher capital increases bank stability and reduces the risk profile 
of banking assets (Baker & Wurgler, 2014). Klomp and de Haan find that capital 
regulation reduces asset risk based on the bank data from OECD (Klomp & de 
Haan, 2012) and emerging and developing countries (Klomp & de Haan, 2015). 
Other empirical results from different banking systems have shown that better 
capitalized banks are more resistant to lending supply in the period of financial 
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market shocks, which improves the banking and economic stability (Kapan & 
Minoiu, 2013). Beltratti and Stulz (2012) show that higher bank capital reduces 
the fragility of banking firms and increases the bank’s ability to absorb the effects 
of financial crisis. During the last financial crisis and the significant increase in 
capital requirements, the banking firms met a new capital requirement with the 
reduction of risk-weighted asset (mostly in downsizing of lending activities) or 
the rise of the regulatory capital volume (some banks with regulatory capital 
ratio near or lower the minimum threshold)1. Some authors have found that an 
additional rise in capital requirements reduces total lending from 3.5 percent 
(Bridges et al., 2014) up to 7.2 percent (Aiyar, Colomiris, & Wieladek, 2014). 
Mésonnier and Monks (2015) analyzed the systematically important banks’ effect 
of enforcement on increasing core capital in a 1.2 percent reduction of credit 
growth. The empirical evidence has shown that most banks have not funded the 
additional capital requirements by raising the equity. External equity financing is 
always costly because of the significant asymmetric information about the bank 
net value (Asal, 2015). Acharya and Steffen (2014) have concluded that most 
banks manipulated with risk models to underestimate risk and minimize capital 
requirements. Potential investors may consider equity originating in terms of 
overvalued current shares in case where a problem of adverse selection exists. 
Hanson, Kashyap, and Stein (2011) have found that raising capital requirements 
produces a positive impact on marginal costs of banking firms’ equity. Recent 
financial crisis has confirmed negative investors’ sentiment to banking shares. 
The share prices of the banking firms have not prevailed in the pre-crisis period 
and shareholders are unmotivated for a new issue due to the capital splitting risk. 
This is the reason why—by increasing equity—banks orient themselves toward 
the accumulation of retained earnings (Cohen, 2013). The main purpose of this 
paper is to model the behavior of banking firms during the announcement and 
implementation of new capital requirements in the period of ongoing financial 
and banking crisis. As far as banking stability and activities are concerned, 
1 Banks with a high ratio of non-performing loans and with low regulatory capital ratio increased equity mostly 
by capitalization of present owners or the debt-to-equity swap (e.g. Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena increased 
its capital by EUR 3.8 billion, while UniCredit increased its capital by EUR 13 billion in Italy’s biggest public 
offering).
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prudential regulators are faced with a risk of downsized lending to customers, 
securities volume, and interbank assets.
2  Empirical Research
The basis of the empirical research is the analysis of the banking firm adoption 
to the new regulatory capital requirements. With respect to complying with 
the new capital structure and regulatory capital ratio requirements, the main 
research hypotheses have been developed:
•	 Banking firms will decrease risk-weighted assets by mostly reducing the 
lending activities.
•	 Banking firms in the period of the financial crisis are not ready to increase 
the equity because of the significant capital costs and negative investment 
sentiment to the banking shares.
The analysis will be done on the representative sample of the European Union’s 
systematically important banks.
2.1  Data Selection
The survey was conducted on a sample of 35 banking groups operating in the 
EU for the period 2000–2016, selected by the size of assets. The total share of 
the observed group of banks, according to the asset size criterion in total assets 
of the European Monetary Union (EMU) credit institutions, was approximately 
78.9 percent at the end of 20162. Therefore, the chosen banking companies are 
unquestionably taking the position of market makers on a single EU banking 
market. The total assets of the observed banks amounted to EUR 23,514,793 
million, while the total assets of the EMU credit institutions amounted to 
EUR 29,810,935 million on December 31, 2016. In addition to the size of the 
2 A selected sample of banks is shown in the Appendix Table 1.
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asset and the significance of a particular group that is defined by experiential 
knowledge, an additional basic criterion for selecting a particular group in a 
sample of observations is also the public listing, i.e. the criterion of listed shares 
of a group of banks in the European Union capital markets for which the Orbis 
database (Bankscope) is used as an additional check. Namely, the sample of 
this research was formed based on the data obtained from the Reuters database, 
referring to the balance sheet of each selected group, as well as on business 
indicators and individual relevant regulatory capital positions predefined by the 
Basel III standard. In this way, maximum relevance, impartiality, and objectivity 
is ensured during statistical processing, presentation, and finally, when relevant 
judgments are made as a result of previous empirical research. Data and related 
indicators are taken from the consolidated annual reports of the observed group 
of banks published in accordance with the International Financial Reporting 
Standards (IFRS). The issues of merger and acquisitions that are contained in 
the same consolidated reports for the period 2000–2016 were not considered 
relevant for the research problem. Large regional and development banks are 
excluded from the sample under the criterion of public listing as the same do not 
entirely comply and operate under market criteria although they are subject to 
the same banking regulation in question.
2.2  Variable Description
The dependent variable of this survey is the growth of Risk-Weighted Assets 
(RWA). Independent variables are directly or indirectly related to the ability of a 
banking firm to meet regulatory capital requirements; and the selected ones are:
•	 NPL/TL – The ratio of non-performing loans (potentially risky loans for 
which the value adjustment was made) and total loans expressed in percentage.
•	 D – Increase of all received deposits of individual banking groups expressed 
in percentage.
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•	 FR – Net fee revenue in percentage.
Indicators of the macroeconomic environment of the observed banking groups 
are primarily related to the EU area. Although global banking groups have 
revenue outside the EU as well, their dominant business activities are taking 
place in the EU economic area. Macro indicators as control variables are3:
•	 UNPLEU – The unemployment rate in the EU-28 countries, expressed in 
percentage.
•	 GDP – The GDP growth of the EU-28 countries, expressed in percentage.
In addition to the abovementioned bank and macroeconomic environment 
variables, and for the purpose of empirical analysis of the subject research, it 
has been necessary to define the period of announcement and enforcement of 
prudential regulations of capital requirements on the basis of which banks’ 
behavior and alignment would be observed. Namely, one of the basic assumptions 
of this research is that any regulatory modeling of banking business, primarily 
in the function of securing financial stability, produces direct causal effects on 
the structure and volume of bank assets. The basic breakdown of the variables 
has been made for 2010 (announcement of the Basel III standard), as well as for 
the year 2013 (implementation of the Basel III standard), 2015 (implementation 
of the Liquidity Cover Ratio – LCR) and 2016 (implementation of the Capital 
Conservation Buffers), which altogether represent the years of enforcement.
In this way, two other variables of empirical research have been formed:
•	 DLA – Announcement of regulatory measures. The announcement period of 
regulatory measures—i.e. when the value of the variable is 1—starts in 2010 
and lasts until the end of the observed period. For all other years the value of 
this variable is 0.
3 The observed indicators are downloaded from the common database of the European Central Bank (ECB) as well 
as from the common statistical database Eurostat.
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•	 DLE – Enforcement of regulatory measures. The period of enforcement of 
the regulatory measures (value of the variable is 1) begins in 2013 and lasts 
until the end of the observed period. For all other years the value of this 
variable is 0.
The description of all variables and the expected impact of independent variables 
are given in Table 1.
Table 1:  The Description of Variables and the Expected Impact of the Independent Variables
Label Definition of the variable Expected impact
RWA Risk-Weighted Assets (EUR mil.); Level of the banking industry credit activity Dependent variable
NPL/TL Level of the credit risk of an individual bank and the quality of the loan portfolio (in %) -
D The most stable and highest quality source of credit growth (in %) +
FR Indicator of banks' activities that does not include lending and other forms of core business (in %) -
DLA Period of regulatory announcement +/-
DLE Period of regulatory enforcement +/-
UNPLEU Unemployment rate in the EU-28 (in %) -
GDP Gross domestic product in the EU-28 (in %) +
Source: The authors' definition and expectation.
The general characteristics of the variables of the observed sample were determined 
by descriptive statistics as shown in Table 2. The data processing of the survey 
data was done by the STATA 14.2 statistical package.
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Table 2:  Descriptive Statistics of Sample Variables
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Banks’ business indicators
RWA 481 204.038 179.258 21.689 1.015.649
NPL/TL 268 19.03 107.14 0.05 1.393.30
D 576 22.57 286.38 -82.50 6.788.60
FR 583 31.84 28.07 -112.10 573.80
Macroeconomic environment
UNPLEU 595 9.08 0.98 7.00 10.90
GDP 595 1.48 1.82 -4.40 3.90
Source: Authors’ calculation.
The dynamic analysis of the dependent variables of our research was made as the 
calculation of the average value for all the banking groups at the level of each 
observed year (Table 3). Although the number of observations is not the same 
at the level of the whole sample, which could somehow reduce the credibility of 
the approximation through the calculation of the average annual value, in this 
way, we still have enough data to obtain a simpler insight into the dynamics of 
the observed portfolio of banks as well as the movement of the credit assets in a 
unit of time.
Table 3:  Average Value of the Dependent Variable of the Sample at the Level of the Total 
Portfolio of Observed Groups of Banks, in EUR Million4
Year 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Avrg_TRWA 119.010 134.504 126.351 133.242 152.032 179.624 203.977 227.175 253.310
Year 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
Avrg_TRWA 250.858 245.642 235.492 205.367 244.571 229.577 235.809 223.266
Source: Authors’ calculation.
4 The dynamics of the average value of all banking groups’ assets and return on equity are shown in the Appendix 
Figure 1.
77
Ivica Klinac and Roberto Ercegovac
Banking System Adjustment to Regulatory Capital Requirements
Croatian Economic Survey  :   Vol. 20   :   No. 2   :   December 2018   :   pp. 69-96
The dynamics of the average value of credit assets of the banking groups’ portfolio 
recorded a strong growth to about EUR 253,000 million in 2008, after which 
sharp downfall adjustments were recorded. Significant recovery occurs later in 
2013 by returning approximately to 2010 levels, while the further downward 
trend ends with a value close to the level of 2007 (even slightly lower).
In addition to the basic analysis of the dynamics of the dependent variables, it 
was necessary to evaluate whether there are differences in the arithmetic means 
of the banking group variables before and after the announcement of regulatory 
changes as well as before and after the enforcement of the regulatory measures, 
using a two-way t-test.
Table 4:  Results of the Two-Way T-Test of Differences in Arithmetic Means of the Observed 
Sample Variables for the Announcement Period and the Enforcement of Regulatory 
Measures



























































Notes: * denotes significance at 10 percent; ** denotes significance at 5 percent; *** denotes significance at 1 percent.
Source: Authors’ calculation.
The dependent variable of the observed bank sample shows the statistical 
significance of differences in arithmetic means before and after the announcement 
of regulatory measures as well as before and after the enforcement of regulatory 
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measures. The obtained results are expected and confirm the basic assumptions 
of the research on the significance of the selected variables and the expected 
influence of regulation on the banking industry. Unlike the dependent variables, 
the independent deposit growth variable (D)—before and after the establishment 
of the new regulatory framework—did not show statistical significance of 
differences in arithmetic means. Although deposits after the announcement 
of regulatory measures have increased by 34.3 percent on average, significant 
corrections in average growth came after the enforcement of the measures, i.e. 
only 1.6 percent. 
Following the announcement of new, more stringent capital requirements 
implementation, there is a significant average increase of non-performing loans 
in total loans (NPL / TL) of 27.6 percent, although with a lack of statistical 
significance. By the enforcement of the new regulatory environment, the 
expected increase in the share of non-performing loans in total loans (NPL / 
TL) continued, but also with the absence of statistical significance. Finally, it 
is logical to expect a more stringent regulatory regime of creditworthiness and 
reduced lending to small- and medium-sized companies with larger risk weights 
by the banking firms as well as further regulatory compliance with the relative 
reduction in the share of assets with credit risk.
The independent variable of average net income from fees and provisions (FR) 
recorded an average decline after the announcement of the regulatory measure, 
from 32.9 percent to 30.3 percent, and a slightly higher than average increase of 
+1.7 percent after the enforcement of the measure.
Before the formation of the final model, it was necessary to check the correlation 
between the selected variables. According to the present knowledge, a 
multicollinearity test in panel models does not exists, while coefficients between 
pairs of potential independent variables are used in empirical issues related to 
multicollinearity testing.
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Table 5:  Correlation Matrix: Impact on Risk-Weighted Assets
RWA NPL/TL D FR
RWA 1
NPL/TL -0.0995 1
D 0.3443*** -0.0014 1
FR -0.0661 0.0106 -0.0317 1
Notes: * denotes significance at 10 percent; ** denotes significance at 5 percent; *** denotes significance at 1 percent.
Source: Authors’ calculation.
Table 6:  Correlation Matrix: Macroeconomic Environment and Dummy Variables of 
Regulatory Measures
DLA DLE UNPLEU GDP
DLA 1
DLE 0.6630*** 1
UNPLEU -0.0652 -0.3623*** 1
GDP -0.0643 0.0130 -0.7566*** 1
Notes: * denotes significance at 10 percent; ** denotes significance at 5 percent; *** denotes significance at 1 percent.
Source: Authors’ calculation.
Based on the correlation matrix results in Table 5, it can be concluded that 
there are no pairs of variables which could cause multicollinearity with the 
simultaneous inclusion in the model if we consider that there is no coefficient 
that exceeded the value of 0.5. The results from Table 6 suggest a significant 
correlation between the dummy variables, which is expected and will not be 
separately considered. In the same way, the expected multicollinearity problem 
can be seen by the simultaneous inclusion of the unemployment variable and 
gross domestic product in the empirical models. Although the relationship 
between these two macro variables is logical and expected, the model estimates 
will be made by substituting them alternately.
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After the descriptive statistics—the t-test of the differences in the arithmetic mean 
of the selected empirical research variables and the correlation matrix results—
it is necessary to define the model of influence of the prudential regulation of 
capital requirements on bank credit assets.
2.3  Research Model
Although the econometric analysis is improving and becoming more accurate, 
empirical research has shown that the data being analyzed have simultaneous 
temporal and spatial components. Such data containing the temporal and spatial 
components of some variables are called panel data.
According to Verbeek (2004), the main advantage of panel data, compared to 
time series or cross-sectional assemblies, is that they allow the identification 
of certain parameters or questions without the need to limit the assumptions. 
Many economic models suggest that current behavior depends on past behavior 
(persistence, habit forming, partial adaptation etc.), so that in many cases we 
want to evaluate a dynamic model on an individual level. The ability to do that 
is unique to panel data.
Panel data allows for an analysis of changes at an individual level and, accordingly, 
one of the main advantages of panel analysis is the ability to model individual 
dynamics. The panel analysis also highlights the control of heterogeneity at the 
individual level and the difference between the observed units is assumed as 
well. Models that do not have this feature can have negative implications in 
the context of estimating bias (Wooldridge, 2002). Various authors argue that 
panel models possess greater variability, estimating efficiency, lower possibility 
of multicollinearity, and greater degrees of freedom. Panel data analysis retrieves 
maximum information from a limited number of observations over a given period 
and maximizes the number of degrees of freedom. In this way, a higher efficiency 
of model parameters with less restrictive assumptions is assured. Advantage is 
also reflected in reducing the size of econometric problems that are present in 
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classical econometric research. Škrabić Perić (2012) points to the advantages of 
panel analysis in that it enables the definition and testing of more complicated 
econometric models and that it also reduces the multicollinearity problem. 
Namely, if two variables of the same observation unit are strongly correlated, but 
this correlation is not expressed between other observation units, this correlation 
loses its significance.
On the other hand, panel data model constraints arise when basic assumptions 
of panel analysis are disturbed, such as distortions in measurement, time-
series dependence, short observation period within the time series, availability 
problem or lack of panel data at certain time periods. Some of the econometric 
problems inherent in time-scale data—heteroscedasticity and time-series 
autocorrelation—should also be noted. According to the availability of data, we 
differentiate between the balanced panel data (each data unit in each period for 
all variables has the necessary data available) and the unbalanced panel data (if 
any observation unit lacks data for a variable in a given period).
For the purposes of this study, panel analysis was performed using a static 
and dynamic panel, as well as using a dynamic panel with a GMM estimator. 
For each static and dynamic panel, fixed effects – Fe and random effects – Re 
analyses were also performed, while a dynamic panel with a GMM estimator 
was performed with one or two steps (the Arellano-Bond dynamic panel-data 
estimation GMM-type; one-step/two-step). Considering that the observed 
variables of this empirical research are of dynamic nature, the static panel 
models are not appropriate for estimating the same variables due to the absence 
of autocorrelation, i.e. the dependence of the present value of a variable on its 
previous value (Škrabić Perić, 2012). Therefore, dynamic panel models have been 
selected for further analysis and the basic model for the selected variables can be 
written as follows:
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yi,t = µ + γ ∙ yi,t-1 + β1 ∙ xi,t1 + β2 ∙ xi,t2 +...+ βk ∙ xi,tK + αi + εi,t , i = 1,....N , t = 1,...T,     (1)
where i is the unit, t is time, µ is a constant member, γ a parameter of a dependent 
variable with a lag, β1, β2,..., βK are parameters of exogenous variables, xi,t are 
independent variables, αi is a specific error for a i-th bank, and εi i represents the 
error of relation of the i-th bank.
The number of observation units (bank groups) exceeds the number of observation 
periods that meet the requirement for the Arellano-Bond estimator. Due to the 
presence of the standard error bias for the GMM estimator in two steps, additional 
panel model analysis made the choice of a dynamic panel with a GMM estimator 
in one step. The analysis also found that the number of instruments does not 
exceed the number of cross-sections, so the properties of the GMM estimator 
system are not compromised. To keep the number of instruments under control, 
a one-step dependent variable is used as an instrument.
Finally, Arellano-Bond’s one-step estimator with the use of robust standard error 
will be used for testing the research hypothesis. Due to the use of a number of 
variables in the proposed model, the same variables could not be included in 
the model at the same time. In the function of verifying the hypothesis, the 
basic model had to be expanded by introducing the dummy variable of the 
announcement and enforcement of regulatory measures. By using the robust 
standard error in a model for which the Sargan test cannot be used, the validity 
of the models is estimated on the basis of the autocorrelation test of the first 
differences of the second-order residuals.
2.4  Results and Discussion
In order to test the hypothesis of our research, the basic model can be written via 
equation 2 (MODEL1) and equation 3 (MODEL2) by using different control 
variables:
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∆LogRWAit = µ + γ ∙ ∆LogRWAi,t-1 + β1 ∙ ∆NPL/TLit 1 + β2 ∙ Dit 2 + β3 ∙ ∆FRit 3        (2)
+ β4 ∙ GDPit 4 + αi + εit,
i = 1,....N , t = 1,...,T.
∆LogRWAit = µ + γ ∙ ∆LogRWAi,t-1 + β1 ∙ ∆NPL/TLit 1 + β2 ∙ Dit 2 + β3 ∙ ∆FRit 3       (3)
+ β4 ∙ ∆UNPLEUit 4 + αi + εit ,
i = 1,....N , t = 1,...,T.
Table 7 presents the results of model estimate of the influence of regulatory 
requirements on banks’ credit activity. All models satisfy the test of second-order 
autocorrelation of the first residuals AR (2), i.e. on the 5 percent significance 
level, the test does not reject the null hypothesis that there is no second-order 
correlation of the first residual differences, indicating thereby that there is no 
autocorrelation between the residuals in the model. It can be concluded that the 
models are well-specified.
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Almost all variables for MODEL1 and MODEL2 are statistically significant and 
with the expected signs. Coefficients of the dependent variable from the previous 
period are statistically significant and contribute to the decrease of the dependent 
variable of the current period, which is in line with the expectations and basic 
assumptions of empirical research. Independent variables of the increasing share 
of non-performing loans in total loans and the growth in net income for fees 
and provisions negatively affect the growth of banks’ credit assets. Namely, the 
choice of the credit strategy of the banks’ management structures and credit risk 
perception directly affect the increase in the share of non-performing loans in 
the structure of banking assets. The deterioration of the regular repayment of 
approved loans leads to an increase in the provision for problem loans, which 
directly affects the internal fund reallocation within a bank firm. Insufficient or 
inefficient diversification of banking assets leads to the materialization of credit 
risk and the increase in the value adjustment of the credit placements, i.e. the 
reduction of their fair value. The increased credit risk and the consequent negative 
impact on regulatory compliance lead to an increase in investment in risk-free 
assets and an increase in the activities of banks that do not include lending and 
other forms of the core banking business (e.g., transactional banking, brokerage 
services, and other forms of financial services). An increase in revenue from the 
so-called non-credit activities (fees, provisions etc.) influences the decrease of the 
value of the risk-weighted assets as a whole.
The positive sign of the coefficient of deposit growth variables indicates a relative 
increase in the share of deposits in the total sources of funding for the increase 
of banks’ credit assets. Better quality of deposit coverage, i.e. lowering the risk 
weighting of the credit assets, makes it easier to meet regulatory requirements as 
a whole.
The control variable of the macroeconomic environment of GDP growth shows 
statistical significance and the expected sign, i.e. the increase in GDP is, among 
other things, the result of the increase in the banking industry credit assets. 
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The introduction of the unemployment rate as the control variable in the basic 
MODEL2 did not show any statistical significance when compared to GDP.
In the next step, the basic model has been extended by introducing the variable 
of regulatory announcement (DLA), as well as by introducing a variable of 
regulatory measure enforcement (DLE). In accordance with the pre-defined 
models, testing will also be done according to defined changes in control variables 
of banks’ macro-business operations.
An extended model can be written using the equation (MODEL3):
∆LogRWAit = µ + γ ∙ ∆LogRWAi,t-1 + β1 ∙ ∆NPL/TLit 1 + β2 ∙ Dit 2 + β3 ∙ ∆FRit 3       (4)
+ β4 ∙ DLAit 4 + β5 ∙ GDPit 5 + αi + εit ,
i = 1,....N , t = 1,...,T,
i.e. by using the unemployment rate control variable in the equation (MODEL4):
∆LogRWAit = µ + γ ∙ ∆LogRWAi,t-1 + β1 ∙ ∆NPL/TLit 1 + β2 ∙ Dit 2 + β3 ∙ ∆FRit 3        (5)
+ β4 ∙ DLAit 4 + β5 ∙ ∆UNPLEUit 5 + αi + εit ,
i = 1,....N , t = 1,...,T.
Coefficients of banks’ business indicators presented as the non-performing loans 
growth rates, as well as an increase in net income for fees and provisions are of 
the same negative sign and are statistically significant as in previous models, 
while the growth of the deposit is of the counter sign and contributes to the 
reduction of the risk of credit assets. Furthermore, the value of β4 coefficient of 
the DLA variable, upon which the test is performed in both observed models, 
is positive and statistically significant, i.e. it is evident from both models that 
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the introduction of the regulatory variable of announcement positively affects 
the risk-weighted assets. Namely, the results of MODEL3 and MODEL4 show 
that already with the announcement of the regulatory measures, the banking 
group started to adapt to new capital requirements. By reducing the risk of credit 
assets—particularly due to a lack of financing of the small- and medium-sized 
companies (SMEs) and more risky projects—the banking firm has the influence 
on compliance with regulatory requirements without changing the equity or the 
ownership structure. However, the lack of significance of the domestic product 
growth rate in relation to the credit assets growth suggests that there is no serious 
credit activity of the banking industry in the function of boosting the credit 
cycle and domestic product growth following the announcement of regulatory 
measures. The control macro variable of the unemployment rate is also not 
statistically significant.
The introduction of regulatory enforcement variable into models (DLE) has been 
statistically significant and can be expressed by the equation (MODEL5):
∆LogRWAit = µ + γ ∙ ∆LogRWAi,t-1 + β1 ∙ ∆NPL/TLit 1 + β2 ∙ Dit 2 + β3 ∙ ∆FRit 3        (6)
+ β4 ∙ DLEit 4 + β5 ∙ GDPit 5 + αi + εit ,
i = 1,....N , t = 1,...,T,
i.e. by using the unemployment rate control variable in the equation (MODEL6):
∆LogRWAit = µ + γ ∙ ∆LogRWAi,t-1 + β1 ∙ ∆NPL/TLit 1 + β2 ∙ Dit 2 + β3 ∙ ∆FRit 3        (7)
+ β4 ∙ DLEit 4 + β5 ∙ ∆UNPLEUit 5 + αi + εit ,
i = 1,....N , t = 1,...,T.
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Coefficients of a bank’s business indicator are of the same sign and are statistically 
significant as in previous models. The value of β
4
 coefficient of variable regulatory 
enforcement (DLE), based on which the test is performed in both observed 
models, is positive and statistically significant. It is evident from the model that 
the introduction of regulatory measures enforcement variables as well as the 
announcement variable has a positive impact on risk-weighted assets. Namely, 
by implementing the regulatory measures of the capital requirements increase, 
the management structures of banking firms continue to adapt banking assets 
toward new requirements. Credit risk reduction by a relative drop in the share of 
non-performing loans in total loans and the deposit base increase as the source 
of financing opened up the space for increasing the credit assets of the lower risk 
weight. Furthermore, a relative increase in credit assets through better coverage of 
the potential materialization of credit risks ultimately leads to easier compliance 
with the banks’ regulatory requirements.
Coefficient and the absence of significance of the GDP macro variable by 
regulatory measures enforcement confirms the lack of banking sector’s significant 
credit activity while expanding the model with the variable of unemployment 
rate, the same variable that has become statistically significant. In accordance 
with the underlying assumptions of empirical research and the analysis of the 
obtained results, it can be concluded that there is a significant correlation between 
the relative reduction of exposure to more risky sectors of the economy and an 
increase in the unemployment rate. Namely, the realization of credit demand 
for SMEs in bank-centric economies becomes more difficult by declining real 
economic activity. Banking firms forced to meet regulatory requirements 
are turning to finance large and less risky companies, leaving little room for 
small- and medium-sized enterprises for quality restructuring and financing of 
development projects. Since the stated macro-variables are in interdependence, 
the result is not surprising.
Based on the results of the estimated models, the direction and the statistical 
significance of the observed variables, it can be concluded that regulatory 
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measures of increasing capital requirements have negative effects on banks’ credit 
activities.
3  Concluding Remarks
The intensity of financial crisis and its impact on financial system functionality 
caused by prudential regulations has been more forceful than ever in history. The 
main focus of financial authorities lies in the long-term stabilization of financial 
markets. Reactivity of financial institutions under the prudential constrains is 
hard to predict. The adjustment of financial institutions is directly linked to 
the strength of the financial system, the role of the lender of the last resort, 
and the real sector, the consumer of financial services. Long-term instability 
of interbank market and negative sentiment to the equity of banking firms, 
supported by a decrease in real financial sector investments, are the conditions 
for the implementation of new capital requirements and necessary prudential 
measures. Regulatory authorities are faced with the risk of financial institutions 
adapting to new capital requirements by squeezing risk-weighted assets mostly 
by decreasing the loan portfolio. The announcement and the implementation 
of new capital requirements coincides with and is enforced by the culmination 
of financial crisis, with a significant impact on borrowing and lending activities 
and with an increase of loan portfolio credit risk. The analytical model confirms 
negative relations between risk-weighted assets of sampled banks and the volume 
of non-performing loans. Even with the reallocation of financial funds from 
financial markets to the banking sector at the beginning of financial crisis, the 
relative volume of deposit in the long run is in positive relations with lending 
activities due to the ability of the banking sector to create endogenous money. 
Therefore, the model demonstrates negative relations between fee income and 
risk-weighted assets, which indicates transition of banking firms toward new 
products and services and a move out of traditional lending and trading activities. 
Prudential authorities were ready to take over the risk of regulatory measures to 
squeeze credit activity on customers who have significant negative impact on 
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economic growth and development. It is obvious that the banking sector will 
adapt to new capital requirements that are oriented toward limiting bank assets 
growth, decreasing the opportunities of banking firms in speculative activities 
on financial markets, and bringing the banking system back to the traditional 
client-oriented business model. The stability of the banking sector is the primary 
objective of regulatory authorities.
The additional capital buffers are necessary in the long-term stability of the 
European banking sector, with a special approach to systematically important 
banks. The negative consequence of regulatory pressure is that risk banking 
activities will be allocated from prudential regulations into other financial 
institutions. The unregulated shadow banking can increase the costs of adverse 
selection because banks can transfer the risk to financial institutions that are out 
of excessive capital pressure (Plantin, 2014). 
The practical contribution of this research can certainly be seen through 
its potential users. The complexity of the model presentation of banking 
sector behavior in changed regulatory conditions can contribute to a better 
understanding of the same problem by the creators of the regulatory policies and 
regulators themselves. With the expectation of further regulatory alignment in 
favor of preserving the financial stability as a whole and in order to understand 
the reaction of the banking industry toward a simple measure of increasing 
capital requirements, the results of this research are certainly directed to public 
investors and management structures as well.
The biggest and most important limitation of the survey is the unavailability 
of the listing prices of shares of the banking firms. For the same reason, it was 
not possible to include the real market value of the banking sector in the model 
calculation. It would be worthwhile to further model the movement of banks’ 
market underlying value in terms of changing regulatory conditions as a logical 
continuation of research. Additionally, it would be particularly interesting to 
observe the changed ownership structure after the wave of state aid with the aim 
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of stabilizing the banking market has settled. The research did not provide any 
supporting evidence of direct and indirect strengthening of state influence in the 
management structures of banks due to the complexity of the problem.
The abovementioned limitations should certainly be taken into account for 
future research, particularly for research on the structure of non-risky assets and 
their correlation with the capital market. Namely, the phenomenon of banking 
firms in risk transfer to other market players is particularly apparent after the 
last global financial crisis (risk shifting). The abandonment of the socialization 
paradigm concerning the costs of banking failures changes the nature of the 
conflict between social actors. Regulatory authorities, on behalf of taxpayers, 
become more sensitive to the management structures’ behavior, which could 
assist in the return toward traditional sources of evolutionary growth and 
development of the banking sector as a whole.
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Appendix
Appendix Table 1:  A Selected Sample of Banks, in EUR million, on December 31, 2016 




Allied Irish Banks, PLC Ireland 95.622 13.148 13,30 17,60
Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena, SpA Italy 153.179 6.425 -40,30 10,40
Banco BPM, SpA Italy 117.411 7.575 -28,60 16,17
Banco Popular Español, SA Spain 147.686 10.835 -41,90 12,64
Banco de Sabadell, SA Spain 212.508 13.033 7,90 13,80
Banco Santander, SA Spain 1.339.125 90.938 12,0 14,68
Bank of Ireland Group, PLC Ireland 123.129 9.401 11,10 16,40
Bank VTB, PAO Russia 195.415 21.746 4,60 14,60
Barclays, PLC UK 1.423.475 76.122 5,20 19,60
Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria, SA Spain 731.856 47.364 13,50 15,10
BNP Paribas, SA France 2.076.959 100.665 11,40 14,20
CaixaBank, SA Spain 347.927 23.526 6,30 16,20
Commerzbank, AG Germany 480.450 28.560 2,20 15,30
Crédit Agricole, SA France 1.524.232 58.276 6,00 18,60
Danske Bank, A/S Denmark 469.104 20.505 16,80 21,80
Deutsche Bank, AG Germany 1.590.546 64.503 -1,20 16,60
Dexia, SA Belgium 212.771 4.147 7,10 16,80
DNB ASA Norway 292.200 22.734 11,80 19,50
Erste Group Bank, AG Austria 208.227 12.460 16,60 18,20
HSBC Holdings, PLC UK 2.259.087 166.827 3,90 20,10
ING Group, NV Netherlands 845.081 49.793 12,10 19,68
Intesa Sanpaolo, SpA Italy 725.100 48.911 6,70 17,00
KBC Group, NV Belgium 275.200 17.357 18,60 20,00
Lloyds Banking Group, PLC UK 959.593 56.763 8,90 18,40
Nationwide Building Society UK 258.373 12.976 11,90 36,10
Nordea Bank, AB Sweden 615.659 32.409 14,60 24,70
Royal Bank of Scotland, PLC UK 937.138 57.038 -8,00 19,20
Sberbank of Russia, PAO Russia 393.897 43.757 26,10 15,70
Skandinaviska Enskilda Banken, AB Sweden 273.698 14.723 10,50 24,80
Société Générale France 1.382.241 61.953 10,40 17,90
Standard Chartered, PLC UK 615.133 45.978 0,80 21,30
Svenska Handelsbanken, AB Sweden 274.422 14.243 15,60 31,40
Swedbank, AB Sweden 224.983 13.526 18,80 31,80
UBS Group, AG Switzerland 873.833 50.111 7,50 23,18
UniCredit, SpA Italy 859.533 39.336 -25,20 11,66
Source: Reuters.
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Notes: Avrg_TA – total average assets; Avrg_TRFA – total average risk-free assets; Avrg_TRWA – total average risk/
credit assets; Avrg_ROE – total average return on equity; DLA/DLE – time period of announcement / enforcement 
of regulatory requirements.
Sources: Reuters and authors’ calculation.
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